Article Analysis: Regulation and Speed Limits

I chose to analyze the article “Can Roads Control Your Driving? The Truth About Safety-Enhancing Road Design,” posted in the Infrastructurist on March 23, 2011, by Yonah Freemark.  This article addresses the impact of unique transportation engineering on traffic flow and accidents.  A study conducted by the University of Connecticut theorizes that minor reductions in speed are possible through changes in the street environment.  The main issue addressed in the article is that American drivers are twice as likely than European drivers to die in a car accident.  As such, researchers are looking at implementing European road design features to reduce traffic fatalities.  Possible approaches such as roadside parking, building setbacks, and other commercial land uses subconsciously encourage drivers to drive slower.  The author also cites the presence narrow lanes and street trees that result in drivers responding with slower traffic speeds as alternatives to conventional American engineering practices. 

American engineers focus on different alternatives to this European approach.  They tend to favor the idea of “forgiving highways,” with generous curve radii and wider lanes to account for driver mistakes.  These efforts have been successful for interstate highways, but are less successful in urban areas.  Correlating to discussions on regulation, Lawrence Lessig contends “just as government can act to strengthen…social norm constraints, it should be obvious that government can also act to weaken them” (p. 131).  As such, the impact of regulation in terms of traffic control is difficult to perceive because of unique geographic areas.  Additionally, Yonah Freemark also cites higher driver speed limits in suburban areas where there are fewer distractions. 

There are a number of issues addresses in this article that present conflicting viewpoints.  In order to facilitate statistics, researchers must present a stereotype of drivers.  Additionally, in looking at driver environment vs. driving speeds, researchers must take into account any externalities, such as weather, vehicle type, number of vehicle passengers, and others.  Lawrence Lessig asserts, “the policy maker must assess the net effect- whether on the whole…regulations reduce or increase social costs” (p. 132). Those social costs are crucial in this analysis of transportation engineering because they have profound effects on how fast vehicles travel, regardless of street environments. 

One prominent value contradiction referenced in this article is that of personal liberty vs. political satisfaction.  Drivers utilize certain routes because of higher speed limits and fewer distractions.  Any subconscious alteration of a route represents too much government involvement over personal freedoms.  Additionally, there is a conflict between mandates vs. fund appropriation, specifically how localities will implement such a broad reengineering program with limited resources.  Without directly implementing programs, the government runs the risk of demonstrating misdirection.  Code 2.0 references this practice by asserting, “when a government uses other structures of constraint to effect a constraint it could impose directly, it muddles the responsibility for that constraint and so undermines political accountability” (p. 133).  Although the statistics of European transportation engineering are conclusive, municipalities already struggle with decreasing revenues to operate, and may not benefit from roundabout federal or state intervention. 

As discussed in Code 2.0, the four constraints of law, norms, markets, and architecture are “distinct, yet they are plainly interdependent” (p. 124).  In referencing the issue of transportation engineering, each constraint is prevalent in regards to solving speed limit problems. 

As such, the following alternative will decrease traffic fatalities while offering options to commuters:

In a specific locality, implement a testing zone regulated and monitored by the city council to experiment with altered traffic environments.  The area is to remain unknown to the public, though the initiative is to be approved by local citizens as a means to procure publicity and transparency.  To ensure maximum results, the council should select a one-mile stretch of urban roadway to plant large trees and park areas.  The speed limit will be reduced by five miles/hour, and vehicle types and numbers will be analyzed over a one-month period.  The ultimate goal of the experiment is to assess the number of fatalities, and whether the environment and speed alterations deterred or encouraged more drivers to pass through the urban roadway.  If successful results are witnessed, the locality could implement more large-scale changes to enact long-term traffic modifications.

                This model is useful in describing the impact of this transportation engineering option.  Although this idea utilizes practices from other European counterparts, the initial planning addresses voter concerns and ensures publicity to avoid implications against personal liberty.

Law:      The experimental roadway stretch is monitored and governed by the locality through speed limit reductions.  Local citizens approve of the implementation of this process through an initiative, thought they are unaware of the specific location of the analyzed roadway.  This does not conflict with personal liberty because they approve of the experiment.  As discussed by Lessig, “…law continues to threaten a certain consequence if it is defied” (p. 124).  As such, punishments will be similar to any other traffic violation.

Norms:  If traffic fatalities are reduced in this roadway stretch, local citizens will become accustomed to new environments, thus altering their driving behavior.  Lessig contends, “norms constrain through the stigma that a community imposes” (p. 124).  This constraint will meet with short-term disagreement, as local citizens will have to alter their driving.  However, they will come to expect this new safety level, and fatalities will decrease.

Markets:  In a sense, the locality is charging citizens in time by decreasing speed limits.  This charge, however, is paid back to the citizens through decreased traffic incidents.  Lessig theorizes, “these behaviors are all a function of market constraints and market opportunity” (p. 124).  The locality benefits by providing landscapes to the roadways, thus increasing competition among private contractors. 

Architecture:  This roadway design of landscaped roadways and decreased speed limits makes possible values of safe driving.  Lessig asserts, “they constrain some behavior by making other behavior possible or impossible” (p. 125).  This regulates speeding by lowering the speed limit and creating an indirect distraction.  It is design to modify behavior to have lasting effects.

This alternative addresses the concerns raised by the conflicting values indirectly referenced in this article.  Lawrence Lessig references the choice of residence and its relation to personal liberty.  On page 135, he theorizes, “individuals choose to live in one neighborhood rather than another.  In a strict sense, that is correct, but their choices are made in the face of costs that the state has imposed.”  By having citizen input in regards to the most pressing areas in need of traffic alterations, citizens show pride in their community, and determine where safety is most lacking.  This results in long-term satisfaction and changing demographics that result from simple changes in traffic flow. 

                In general, I agree with the basic premise of the article.  The author poses an appropriate question: “will it be enough to dissuade states from continuing to fund suburban arterials that weave through residential neighborhoods and allow drivers to move at high speeds?”  The wide-lane American highways are a unique alternative to curbing traffic incidents, though speed remains the key issue.  The author fails to explain how logistics would be addressed.  As such, I feel my alternative incorporates the success of European models by implementing ideas of city management and voter approval.  Doing so will regulate driving and elicit input from citizens so as not to decrease personal liberty. 

References

Lessig, Lawrence (2006).  Code: Version 2.0.  New York City, New York: Basic Books.